Riches from rags: Bosses and unions in the Cape clothing industry 1926-1937 by Nicol, Martin
RICHES FROM RAGS: BOSSES AND UNIONS IN 
TI33 CAPE CLOTHING INDUSTRY 1926-1937 
by 
Martin Nicol 
The Union has always had an excellent working 
relationship with not only the Industrial Council .,. 
but with the employer orgmisations as well. This 
has resulted in a very stable Clothing Industry in 
the Western Cape .* 
During the late 1920s and the 1930s a strong, militant gament workers' union was 
built up in the Transvaal. Solly Sachs, Joanna Cornelius, Anna Scheepers and others 
led the union through more than a hundred strikes in a successful battle for improved 
wages a3ld conditions. In addition, the union held against a barrage of vicious 
attacks from Afrikaner nationalists intent on wrestin$ control from "the Jew-Communist 
Sachs". The brave stnggle of young Afrikaner workers against --cutting bosses and 
their rejection of the fascist ideology of the ATrikaner nationalists provided an 
encouraging example to the rest of the South African labour movement. (1) 
This was in sharp contrast to the experience of the garment workers of Cape 
Town who had to confront a union, closely in league with the factory owners, wuch 
condoned substantially lower wages than in the Transvaal and refused to lead a fi&t 
against poor conditions. The alliance between the local clothing manufacturers and 
the leadership of the Cape Federation of Labour Unions (and the conditions of class 
struggle which allowed it to flourish) effectively countered all attempts to form a 
militant garment workers' union in Cape Town. The failure of these various attempts 
to mobilize Cape garment workers significantly illwminates the operation of South 
African industrial legislation. Specifically, it shows how the W a g e  and Industrial 
Conciliation Acts operated to structure the alliance and prevent the emergence of a 
militant trade &on in the Cape clothing industry. (2) 
Kaplan has argued that the Pact government, through the Industrial 
Conciliation Act and at the cost of certain limited economic concessions: 
... was able to provide for the incornoration of the 
White Trade Unions into the state structures, and to 
ensure that no direct coylrrontation between capital 
and the white wage earners on a scale comparable to 
the Rand revolt was repeated. (Kaplan 1977: 109) 
"Garment Workers Union of the Western Province, Public Relations Handout, 1978. 
Most writers who have comented on the class character of the Industrial Conciliation 
Act stress its racially discriminatory aspects, its provisions curtailing the right 
to strike and the manner in which the industrial council system promotes the 
bureaucratization of unions and the apathy of the workers (~avies 1975; 1977: 169-76; 
Simons 1969: 332-4). They generally emphasize the enervating effects the legislation 
had on originally militant unions once they were incorporated into the centralized 
bargaining procedures of the industrial council system. This paper traces the 
relationship between the Cape Wholesale Clothing and Shirt MaJnufacturers Association 
l (cwcMA) (3) and the Gamnent Workers! Union of the Cape Peninsula (GWIT-CP) (4) in the ten years prior to the formation of an industrial council in 1936. It shows fhat the 
power of the W s t e r  of Labour to register one union over another at a crucial time 
has eqyd possibilities for influencing the nature of trade unionism in an industry 
at an earlier stage. In the case of the Cape clothing ,industry, the Minister upheld 1 tk?e registration of a union committed to conciliation a d  collaboration with the 
emp1o;yers (and having a press-ganged. membership) against a union which insisted that 
workers could advance their interests only throw strong organization. 
l I have chosen to focus on the alliance between the CWMB and the Gm-CP because it is central to an understanding of garment worker action (or inertia) in 
~ Cape Town. Considerations of length prevent me from detailing the role of the police, 
1 the courts and the Department of Labaur in suppressing axd impeding militant action 
by garment workers or from presenting an analysis of the n a t m  of -the class struggle 
I in Cape Tom. These will be covered in my thesis. 
The paper also serves to illustrate (for the Cape clothing industry) the 
point, made by Davies and E(B;plan for the economy in general, that, while %h.e Pact 
govement did make concessions to white wage earners, these were not of such a 
magnitude as to undermine seriously the processes of accumulation of capital (~avies 
1977: 193; =plan 1977: 94). The civilized labour policy, industrial protection 
and the actions of the Wage Board did expand white employment (5) and raise levels 
in the clothing industry, but at the same time these measures usherod in a new wave of 
expansion. Hi&er wage rates forced factories to rationalise the labour process and. 
tariff barriers protected the market from overseas competition. 
IChe first clothing factory in South Africa was established in Cape 'bown in 
1907. Faced with strong competition from imports, the industry bras slow in developing 
and by 1925 there were only about one thousand garment workers on the Reef and slightly 
fewer in Cape Tom. After the introduction of tariff protection by the Pact government 
in 1925, the number of clothing factories grew steadily to employ more than 16,000 
workers in 1937/8. (6) The industry in the Transvaal began by producing cheap clothing 
for African mine-workers, but it soon diversified to become also the maSn centre for 
the production of the "better class" of menls outer wear. High quality shirt and 
pyjama production was confined to Cape Town, (7) !Phe two centres competed with one 
another (and with imports) over the supply of menls outer wear and government contracts. 
The wages of garment workers in the 1920s and 1930s were extremely low and 
conditions were often appalling. (8) The clothing industry is particularly labour 
intensive, with wages constituting the major element of cost after materials (~arker 
1962: 127) The technology in use does not confer aqy economies of scale on larger 
factories which small operators cannot make up through a more intensive exploitation 
of their work force. lYany small production units can enter the industry and competition 
is exceptionally keen (Barker 1962: 191), All factory owners are forced to drive wage 
costs down to their lowest level if they are to survive. This often leads to workers 
being paid less than the cost of the reproduction of their labour power. Women workers, 
who fom %he backbone of the labour force, are rarely paid a living wage because they 
are assumed to be supplementary wage earners and need only be paid "pocket money". A 
prominent Cape clothing mnufacturer said before a Select Committee in 1917: 
I certainly do not contend that a girl can live decently 
on 10s. a week. I do not, however, look upon it as a 
serious thing that a large number are paid no more than 
that. The majority of these girls live with their 
families and have their parents behind them. (9) 
Another manufacturer told the Wage Board in 1926: 
The firm alwws desires to get respectable girls. In 
most cases inquiry is made as to the girlvs circumstances - 
where she is living and so forth - but in the case where 
a girl depends on her wage fox a living, she is usually 
told the salary will be inadequate to keep her. (10) 
Other methods for reducing costs included sub-contracting work outside the factory, 
working long hours and speeding up production. "Cut, PI&@ and Trimu concerns at Ifthe 
lower end of the trade" were paxticularly bad employers. (11) In the absence of 
effective legislation, sweated conditions were common and remained the curse of both 
workers and many employers until at least 1936. (12) 
One of the first tasks of the Wae Board was an investigation of wages and 
conditions prevailing in the clothing industry. The publication of the Board's 
recommendation in September 1926 caused great consternation amongst Cape clothing 
manufacturers. The manufacturers had proposed a wage scale for female machinists (who 
were the majority of workers) ranging from a 108 per week starting wage to 17s in the 
fourth year and 25s thereafter. The Board brished to set a starting wage of 208, rising 
to 37/6 over two years and 40s per week as the qualified was. (13) The manufacturers 
argued that such a wage scale "would spell immediate ruin". It would reduce their 
profit considerably and force then all to close their factories. (14) 
The manufacturers erected two lines of defence against the adoption of the 
recomendation. Firstly, they began to protest in public and by deputation against 
the recommendation. Secondly, they planned to pre-empt any interference in their 
industry on the part of the Wage Board by fodng an industrial council which would 
set a new scale of wages arrived at by negotiation between themselves and a trade 
union. The latter presented an immediate problem in that the garment workers of Cape 
Town were unorganized, To overcome this difficulty, the manufacturers asked the Wage 
Board to postpone making a final recommendation for a few months to allow time for the 
establishment of an inclustrial council. W. 5. Lai-Ge, %he secretary of the CWMA, said: 
The employers themselves have given their word ... they 
will put no obstacles in the way of their employees in 
forming a properly organised body that shall be 
representative of their interests ... they have offered 
to assist in any way they can, either by the issuing of 
notices signed.by the finn that no individual need fear 
any reprisals by associating himself with an organisation 
of this character and that employers wish them to be 
associated with their particular union. I think this is 
a somewhat different mental attitude from what was taken 
up by some employers in the past. (15) 
The Wage Board a w e d  to this request, believing it desirable: 
. . . that, 'where possible, conditions of labour should be 
settled by agreement, provided that each party to the 
agreement is reasonably able to protect its own interests. (16) 
But it stipulated that the negotiated wage scales should be sent to it for approval. 
The Board also decided to make an interim recomendation incorporating a revised wage 
scale which the manufacturers had drawn up representing, they claimed, the maximum they 
could possibly pay. This scale was not regarded as being adequate but would provide at 
least some standard for the industry until matters were settled. It was gazetted in 
December 1926 as Wage Determination No. 2. (17) 
The ~lanufactumrs initially tried to organize a trade union themselves, 
under the m e  gtThe Cape Wholesale Shirt and Clothing Factory Employees Union". Each 
f i m  would ask its employees to elect representatives who would meet with the Chief 
Inspector of Labous to prepare a constitution. (18) This strategy was not successful 
and the CWCM had to h to the Cape Federation of Labour Unions for assistance, 
The Cape Federation had been established in 1915 as a eo-ordinating body 
l for the local craft unions, It had expanded to include unions in all sectors of Cape industry, representing both skilled and unskilled workers, from stevedores and leather 
I workers to hairdressers and "Bioscope  employee^'^. Because of the extent -to which 
wcolouredn workers were entrenched in trades (especially building, printing and 
I furniture), the Federation dways espoused non-racial unionism and constaullly 
l criticized the racism of Transvaal unions. The Cape Federation was led. by Robert 
! Stuart, a Scottish stone-mason, who had abandoned his trade in 1914 to become its 
full-tbe secretary. Stuart dominated the Cape trade union movement Tor almost forty 
l years. Intent on maintaining the "autonoqyU of the Cape, he was continually 
responsible for the failure of the repeated efforts to unify the South African trade 
I union movement before 1955 (~illiams 1974). His great crusade was for "pure trade 
l unionismv, which combined aversion to party politics with a firm dislike for trade 
I union militancy. 
l 
Stuart had xcently registered a union of bespoke tailow in Cape Town and 
Laite arranged with him that the factoxy workers would al.so be incorporated in it. (19) 
At the end of March 1927, Stuart brought ten workers to a joint meeting with empl~yer I representatives. Bn industrial council (as yet unregistered) was fanned and an 
l agreement, with vages substantially the same as in the clwent Wage Determination 
l No. 2, was arrived at. (20) It was arranged that trade union subscriptions would be 
collected by stop order. In August the W - C P  was registered under the Industrial 
, Conciliation Act. 
l 
l However, all did not go according to plan. There was conside~able rank and 
I file opposition to the terms of the agreement. (21) This was strengthened by the 
final recommendatioxl of the Wage Board which was much more favourable to the workers 
than the draft agreement (221, and, at a stomy meeting, gament workers voted that ! they wished to have their wages regulated by the Wage Bomd rather than by an industrial council. (23) Stuart resigned as secretary of the Union in disgnst and 
I the "industrial council" became defunct. 
As it became apparent that the Minister intended to gazette the new 
recommendation, the CWCMA. launched a campaign to oppose the Minister "in order to save 
the industry'" (24) But petitions to members of parliament and appeals thm@ the 
press were unsuccessful m d  the recommendation became law in June 1928. 
The prophecies of the CWCMA about the dire effects the determination would 
have on the industry failed to materialize. Indeed, after the new Determination had 
operated for a year the manufacturers declared that it was working "admirablyw. One 
stated that the Determination 
... had increased the efficiency of his employees and 
he was now getting increased output at a lower cost 
per unit under the conditions laid down by the Wage 
Board. (2'5) 
Adaptation to the new conditions was made possible partly by an increase in the duty 
payable on clothing imports (26) and partly through changes in the labour process which 
reduced the period of learnership for machinists. There were no major technological 
innovations (the sewing machine remained the basic unit of machinery), but there was 
a significant extension of the division of labour. As one Cape manufacturer stated 
before the Customs Tariff Comission in 1935: 
... five years ago one girl made the whole garment. A 
shirt hand made the whole shirt and the pyjama hand made 
the whole pair of pyjamas. Todw the work is 
subdivided into definite operations. (27) 
A Transvaal clothing manufacturer explained: 
As a result of this [the division of lab04 the 
efficiency has grown because it is easier for a 
girl to learn one particular operation than to 
learn to do a whole pair of trousers. (28) 
Although novices could learn to be efficient work@rs in a few months (if zot weeks), 
the Wage Board had set a three year learnership period. After the new Determination 
there was a -tic increase in the proportion of lower paid juvenile women workers(29) 
and an increase in labour turnover as 
... many employees ... were turned out of the 
factories vrhen their increases became due, owing 
to their inability to earn the increased wage. (30) 
Beginners would then be taken on at a lower wage. The Board had prescribed a certain 
ratio of learners to qualified workers to control this type of action, but the ratio 
clause was consistently ignored by Cape employers. (31) In order to retain their jobs, 
qualified workers often had to accept learners! wages and keep quiet about it or face 
dismissal. (32) The Determination as a whole was inadequately policed and breaches 
were common. (33) 
The GWTJ-CP provided no protection for workers over this period, as after the 
collapse of the "indus-trial council" it effectively ceased to oderate. Freed from any 
necessity of ensuring the Union's existence, the manufacturers stopped promoting the 
recruitment of members, The Union was reduced to consist of little more than its new 
secretary, a Cape Federation bureaucrat, Henry EV-, and a number of executive members. 
The 'Union's registration certificate still held good, however, and over the next five 
years the Union (in the person of k~ans) invited the manufacturers to fom an industrial 
council on at least six occasions. (34) EVam and the Federation favowred this step 
because they believed it would lead to a more effective enforcement of minimum 
conditions. One suspects that they were also influenced by the knowledge that an 
industrial council would provide jobs for several agents and the probability that the 
counterpart of the workers' industrial co=cil levies would be stop-order subscriptions 
to the Union. A fully enrolled clothing industry would provide a very respectable 
income. 
The manufacturers refused to form an industrial council because it was the 
policy of the Department of Labour to reject any agreement which provided for wages 
lower than those in an existing Wage Determination. The general opinion was that the 
expenses which the manufacturers would incur in the operation of an industrial council 
would not be outwei&ed by savings arising from the other powers of an industrial 
council, such as enforcing the agreement, deciding on holidays and granting exemption 
from wage rises for slow and inefficient workers. 
I1 The First Invasion from the North 
The actions of the Wage Board in dealing with the clothing industry in the 
Cape had been followed with great interest by the Garment Workers! Unioli (GW) in the 
Transvaal. The wages of garment workers in the Transvaal had, since 1925, been 
regulated by an industrial council agreement which set a substantially higker wage 
level than at the Cape, (35) The early, independent organization of Transvaal factory 
workers by the Witwatersrand Tailors, Association (later the GWU) gave them an 
advantage over the employers which Cape workers lacked. GWU made representations to 
the Wage Board to raise the wage level at the coast as the lower wage rates were a 
constant threat to the standards of workers on the Reef. The Board recognized that 
there would be "serious trouble in the industry" if unorganized workers were to accept 
lower wages than well organized workers (36) but maintained that the disparity was too 
great to be adjusted in one step. In 1930 the GWU proposed the formation of a 
national union of garment workers which would fight for a national industrial council 
to regulate wage levels in both centres and remove the threat of mdemutting. 
A meeting was held with the leadership of the Cape Union but no agreement 
was reached. Solly Sachs, the secretary of W, spoke to the press of the "abominablen 
conditions in Cape clothing factories and criticized the refusal of the Cape Union to 
support the move for a national body. (37) Brentually, GWli decided to send an 
organizer to Cape T o m  to build up a rival union. Ben Weinbren took up his post as 
provisional secretary of the South A£ rican Garment Workers 9 Union (SAGW) in mid-1930. 
His task was to recruit sufficient members so that the registration of the GWO-CP as 
the body representative of Cape clothing workefs codd be challenged. At the time the 
GWU-CP was still a "paper union1' with few members and no support. Stmrt (38) 
explained to the CWCNA that if the Registrar of Trade Unions registered a national 
gament workers$ union, able to operate over the whole country, a national industrial 
council might be fomed on the industry 
... which would be detrinental to the Cape 
mufactmrsf interests ... Hr S t d  said that they 
would have to assist in strengthening the trade union 
in the Cape by getting their employees to become 
members, and to still fmther insure against the 
contingency of a National Agreement and domination by 
the Transvaal, he suggested that the Cape clothing 
industry form i-ts own industrial council. and manage 
its own affairs. (39) 
mice again in the following eighteen months Stuart and Evans urged that an industrial 
council be fomed. The mufac-turexs replied that they would not consider this unless 
the Minister agreed that wages lower in the current Wage Detemilration could be 
negotiated. (40) But they did agree to encourage their workers to join the Union =d 
were prepared 
... if necessary to assist the Trade Union to become 
representative of the workers in the industry ... by 
means of a stop order system or sone other method. (41) 
To some extent SAGWU was successful. It orgadzed meetings of workers and 
protested against the non-enforcement of the W a g e  Determination. In September 1931, 
Evans told the CWCNA that 
. . . the position was very critical. At present the local 
union could not claim to be representative and within 
recent weeks the membership of the non-registered Cape 
Town branch of the S,A. Garment Workers' Union has been 
increased so that at present it exceeded the membership 
of their registered Union. (42) 
But ultimately SAGW was unable to follow through its attack on the Cape Union. The 
campaign was launched at the beginning of a lbepression in the clothing industry, and 
unemployment, intimidation by enployers and. the opposition of the leaders of the Cape 
Federation severely harepemd. organization. (43) It was very much in desperation that 
SAGWU called a strike at The African Clothing Factory in September 1931. The strike 
was badly timed, ill-organized and failed utterly. It was supported by very few 
workers, all of whose places were quickly filled from amongst the unemployed. The 
strike ended ignominiously, the SAGW office was closed, and the first attempt to 
form a national union abandoned. 
I11 The Best Method of Defence is an Industrial Council 
Despite the depression, the clothing industry in Cape Town more than doubled 
in size between 1929 and l934. (44) This expansion was aided by a new Wage Determination 
(NO 42) which reduced the wages of the middle range of learners a;nd introduced a flat 
minimum rate for qualified men. (45) The wages of Transvaal workers were cut by 1@/o 
after the union lost a general strike in 1932 and had to submit to arbi%ration. Union 
membership declined shaxply and the next two years were spent in rebuilding the union 
and re-establishing the industrial council. The arbitrator's decision to impose a 
wage reduction was largely influenced by %he lower wage rates prevailing in the Cape 
and in Durban  arker er 1962 : 400). 
So in 1934, as the clothing industry entered a boom period, the Transvaal 
Union initiated a new effort to uplift the low standards of the coastal gament 
workers. Two approaches were to be used. The one involved pressurizing the Wage Board 
to fix a union wage standard for the whole country based on Transvaal wage levels, 
while the other was to fom a national union of gament workers and to encourage the 
coastal workers to take action to improve their oonditions. (46) 
Sachs followed the Wage Board around the country giving evidence in each of 
the centres. Gn arriving in Cape Town, he met Stuart and Ebam to see whether the two 
unions mi&t present a joint memorandum to the Board but they refused all co-operation. 
Sachs therefore decided to establish a rival union which would adopt a militant 
approach to wage demands and hopefully oust the Cape W o n .  men SAGFRJ was revived in 
Marrch 1935, the Cape Union was still little more than a "paper union". Out of the more 
than 4,000 garment workers in Cape Town only 400 were members of the union. (47) At a 
union meeting in January, so the minutes recorded: 
Bro. Evms said of Executive Codttee work: 'Sometimes 
the work was disheartening but they all felt the Union 
must be kept intact, altkow they did not get much 
support from the members who were very apathetic, and up 
to now the number of new members was very small. If it 
was not for the stop-order system operating in a few 
shops, the Union would have collapsed long ago. There 
seems no life, and no response from the workers generally, 
they only thought of the Union when they wem out of work 
or in troub1e.f He hoped that 1935 would be a better year. (48) 
1935 was a much better year. For the intensity of the Transvaalts campaign 
compelloed the employers to strengthen the Cape Union in self-defence. The manufacturers 
were extremely concerned about Sachts aggressive attitude and his declared intention to 
orgaxize a branch of the GWU in Cape Town and have the Cape &ion de-registered after 
obtaining a higber membership for SAGWU. The manufacturers saw in %he Cape lhion 
0fficia1s'~'more likely to take the business point of view" (49) than those in the 
Transvaal union, and so decided to accept the union's proposal of forming 
... a local industrial council and so safeguard the 
industry from the machinations of the Transvaal 
agi.tators . (50) 
The first essential. step was to reorgmize the Cape W o n ,  to increase its membership 
figuses so as to make it immune from charges of not being representative. This was 
achieved by persuading workers to sign stop-order forms. In several instances workers 
who refused to sign were threatened with dismissal. (53) In the space of a few weeks, 
union emolment rocketed. At the end of m an Industrial Council for -the Clothing 
Industry (cape) was foxmed and an application for its registration was sent to the 
Depxctment of Lnbour. The agreement negotiated was, in virtually all respects, much 
less gellerow tq the workers than the new recommendations of the Wage Board which were 
published shortly afterwards. Increroents were given at longer intervals and the 
agreement created eight job divisions which allowed much lower wages for less skilled 
workers. (The Wage Board always favoured flat rates for men and women.) (52) 
In 1927 a similar attempt by the union leadership and the employers to 
pre-empt a W a g e  Determination had failed, partly because the proposed agreement was 
rejected by the workers. In 1935 the union did not repeat the mistake. In the face 
of loud objections from SAGW and union members, the leadership refused to call any 
general meetings and proceeded with the formation of the industrial council in an 
unconstitutional and undemo@ratic manner. Petitions demanding that the Executive 
hold a general meeting were merely ignored. Eventually SAGWiJ resorted to lega.1 
action. A S A W  supporter applied to the Supreme Court for an interdict restraining 
the executive from paxticipating in the establishment of an industrial council until 
a general meeting had been held to allow members to vote on the matter. (53) 
The case proved highly embarrassing for the Cape Union. Ekidence presented 
to the court indicated that the W o n  was completely dominated by Stuart and the 
Federation bureaucrats who surrounded him - none of whom were gament workers. This 
clique ran the Union with scant regard for the constitution, not only as far as 
I concerned the rejection of members' petitions but also in the general administration 
of the union. In giving judgement against the union, the presiding judge said: 
It seems to me that everjthing that has been done on 
the part of the Executive Cotanittee in comtitu%ing 
an Industrial Council and coming to an agreement with 
I employers was improperly and imgdarly done ... 
l 
I [The union leadership] deliberately and without justification refrained from doing their duty; and 
when requested to do what they were required under the 
cowstitution to do, turned a deaf ear to the request. 
Not only was their conduct grossly unreasonable, but 9: 
1 
venture to think it was lacking in bona fides . (54) 
, The order sought was grarnted but the j t was overturned on appeal. A full bench 
of the Supreme Court ruled that the court could not intervene as it was an internal 
1 
I matter for members of the union to resolve themselves. (55) 
Throughout this period, SAGWli was conducting a vigorous organizing campaign. 
Venomous panphlets railed against the Cape Federation, the Department of Lz.boux and 
the wbossesls gament workers9 union. &ss meetings were held to mobilise workers 
against the inckastrial council and the union leadership. Some manufactuem responded 
to these attacks on the union by intimidating workers who supported SAGWU. One said 
that : 
... if any of their employees joined Sa,chfs union, they 
would be dismissed from the factory. (56) 
The CWCMA realized that such extreme actions gave SAGWU ammunition to use against them. 
To counter the effect of this "tactical errortf, they agreed to put it out that workers 
were lqabsolutely free to join any union they wishedn.(57) Intimidation of SAGWU 
supporters did not cease (58) but membership increased steadily. On several occasions 
the manufacturers reported that workers were resigning from the Gape Vnion and exhorted 
Evans to work bmder to do more propaganda work. (59) 
At a special meeting of the CWCMA in November 1935r Stuart asked the 
employers to declare a "closed shoptq in favour of the Cape Union. In the course of 
the discussion which followed, the manufacturers voiced their dissatisfaction with the 
manner in which the union was being run. They criticized the refusal to hold a general 
meeting (litigation had delayed and possibly prejudiced the registration of the 
industrial council) and complained about the unionls organizing methods. One 
mufactuser told Btuart that: 
... the Union was going about the foxmation of their 
Union in a very slipshod manner . . . for every once 
Mk Ebms had been going out, N r  Sachs had been going 
out a dozen times. Unless the Union became nore active 
they would lose entire control. There was no initiative 
amongst -their Executive members, whereas the other people 
were at it all the the, getting into touch with the 
employees, taking them out to tea and all that kind of 
thing. (60) 
In particular, the CWGMA was concerned about the w a ~ r  in which the GWTJ-CP had been 
success~ly dubbed a bosses' union. They urged the union to dishce itself from '. 
them to win back credibility. hother manufacturer commented: 
... there was a definite decision amongst the workers 
that they had no confidence in &an% Union, a d .  
unless the Union woke up sund took action against the 
maaufacturers or anybody else, to show %ha.-& they were 
a live body, they would-lose the support of the 
employees. The Union must be militant. (61) 
In view of the low standing of the union with the mass of workers, the manufacturers 
feared that the institution of a closed shop would provide an issue over which S A W  
could call a general strike. 
m e  Cape Union finally held two general meetings - the one to ratify the 
past acts and omissions of the Executive and the other to make certain changes to the 
constitution. Policemen and t h w  from the Lorry Drivers and Bakers unions were in 
attendance to keep order and prevent questions from being asked. Both mestingy were 
held in an upmar. Such disruption did not revent the leadership from proclaiming 
that all their motions had been carried. (627 
Matters came to a head in February 1936, when a SAGWU member at I. L. Back 
& CO was dismissed for her union activities, (63) Eli Weinberg, %he secretary of S A W ,  
supported by Bill Andrews, addressed a lunchtime meting ou%sitte the factoq- and 
persuaded about a third of the work farce to come out on, strike in pmte%t against .this 
victimization. Tbe strike was used to publicize the struggle against the Cape 
Federation and the GW-CP and protest meetings were attended by workers from all 
sections of industqr. In the second week of the strike, police raided a meeting 
outside the factory and arrested fifty people mder the Riotous Assemblies Act. 
Ei&t (including- Weinberg, Andrews and two Labour MPS were charged. under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act with inciting an illegal strike. (64 !Phis was followed by: 
A Monster Protes"ceting against the Persecution of 
Strikers, Interference of the Police Force, Sweating 
and TTictimization (65) 
on the parade, which a%tracted 10,000 people. M h e r  lmchtime meetings outside many 
factories and solidarity marches through Cape Town continued well into Namh. (66) But 
after seven weeks the majority of the work force was s t i P X  at work and the strike was 
called off. This was a defeaL for SAGWIT, which had to ask the Department of Labour to 
find jobs for the strikers, all of whom had been dismissed. 
After one year of operation, SAGWU had almost I, 3OQ members, about a third 
of all the garment workers in Gape To~m. But by this stage the battle to break the 
Cape Union by force had been lost. !The Ninister refused to gazette the Wage Board 
recommendations and registered the industrial council in February 1937. The industrial 
council agreement became law in April. SAGWCTts campaign had served to cement the 
alliance between the Cape Union and the Manufacturers~ssociation, and participation 
in the industrial council gave the union a powerful new weapon with which to ward off 
any direct assaults by the Transvaal Union. The policy of directly confronting the 
Cape Union appeased to have reached its limits. SAGW therefore intensified its efforts 
to get its supporters elected into leadership positions in the Cape Union and to take 
it over from the inside. However, democracy in the W - C P  did not operate through 
majority votes alone. Stuart and IEvans kept a ti&t control over all the affairs of 
the union. In mid-1937, just as national union supporters were poised for a take-over 
bid, Stuart and his supporters staved off the coup by expelling the dissidents in a 
characteristically high-handed manner. (67) The single factor of the leadership's 
control over the internal ~"dmocratic'~rocesses in the union made an orderly 
constitutional take-over highly unlikely. The additional defences open to the 
leadership against internal attempts to unseat them, such as employer victimization of 
dissidents and the goodwill of the police and labour inspectors, coupled with the 
aloofness of the courts, made them almost completely invulnerable. (68) The alternative 
approach - an attempt to oust the Cape Union itself by the formation of a rival bow - 
met with a wider range of obstacles. Firstly, it was impossible fo r  SAGWET to get 
registration as long as %he enrolment of the Cape Union was maintained by the employers 
and thei r  stop-orders. Secondly, the recruitment of members was hampered by 
in tbidat ion and victimization. (1n l a t e r  years a closed shop allowed the union 
i t se l f  to discipline deserters to  r ival  organizations.) Thirdly, there was the problem 
of funds. SAGW could not finance i t se l f  and had to be subsidized by the GWU. The 
Cape Union became increasingly wealthy and could afford to spend all that was necessary 
on anti-unity organizers and propaganda. Finally, in order to replace the Cape Union, 
SACTWET would f i r s t  have to win the recognition of the employers. Given that the 
employers were firmly united behind the Cape Union, S A W  would have to prove its 
representativeness through successful militant action. This would be extxemely 
diff icult  both because of the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act, which 
made aost strikes i l legal ,  and. because any dispute would, in  the f i r s t  instance, be 
referred to the industrial council. 
The Transvaal Union decided to ca l l  off its offensive i n  Cape Tom i n  July 
1937 and to t ry  to  win over the Cape Union by "peaceful negotiationf'. (69) This step 
was dictated both by the setbacks experienced i n  the two-yeax campaign and by a request 
from the Trades and Labour Council. A new effort  to unite the Cape Federation with 
the rest of the South African labour movement was under way and the GW*e intrusion 
into the Federation's terri tory would impede progress. The wage g;ag between the 
Transvaal and the Cape widened dramatically i n  the boom conditions during and af ter  
the war. Fearful that, when the boom ended, employers would use the wage. disparity 
as an excuse to reduce Transvaal wages, GWCT conducted three more intensive unity 
campaigns i n  the Cape i n  1944, 1945 and 1954-5. A l l  these efforts  were resoundingly 
defeated. Until the mid-1950s, the Transvaal was able to maintain i t s  higher wage 
rates because of hi&er productivity  arker er 1962: 430). But by 1956 compamtive 
labour costs had moved against the Transvaal to such an extent that the Union was 
forced to  accept a substantial cut i n  wage standards. 
There is no w q  of knowing whether the mass of garment workers i n  the Cape 
could have been mobilized behind SAGWU to  fi&t for  the national union, which alone 
could have improved thei r  position. The point i s  that they were never put to the 
test.  me  trade union for  Cape garment workers was chosen by the employers, who 
ensured that it was I1repxesentative", and. by the Minister of Labour, who ignored. the 
dictatorial actions of the controlling clique and registered the industrial council 
i n  1937. The Minister~s action was aided by the courbs, who declared themselves 
unable to  intervene to  prevent violations of the union's constitution because these 
might be ra t i f ied  afterwards by a majority of members. 
The Cape garment workers' union was not a union which was "tamed" by the 
industrial council system (as one might argue i n  the case of: many other registered 
unions). It entered i t s  first industrial council agreement as a 
compliant bosses' union, which the manufacturers had "organized" by arranging the 
enrolment of thei r  workers. But th is  was crucially the effect of the foms of 
organization engendered by South African industrial legislation as a whole, and the 
way in which th is  legislation was administered i n  the specific conditiom of class 
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Notes 
l 
(1) Not all aspects of GWU policy were encouraging. In order to incorporate 
"colouredn workers, the Union bowed to the racism of white gaxaent workers a d  l 
formed a separate "'No 2 Brancha9. 
(2) See Appendix I. l I 
(3) T o w  the Cape Clothing Manufacturers Association. 
(4) T o w  the Gament Workers Union of the Western Province. 1 
See Appendix 111. 
5,700 in Cape Town, 7,900 in the Transvaal and 2,700 in Durban and the Eastern 
Province (Board of Trade and Industries, Report on the ClotMw Industry 80. 303, 
1948) a 
Customs Tariff Comnaission 1935, Wutes of Bidence, p. 707, Transvaal Clothing 
Manufacturers Association (WM) representa%ivest evidence (cape Chanber of 
Industries Archives). 
See Sachs (1957) ; R. S h & ,  "I Look Backtr, in Trade Worn aRuPLetixr,--October 1950. 
SC 4-19179 . 
Wage Board Report, 26. g .l926 (unpubli~hed) , cited in Du Flessis (1-955: 166). 
The Cut, Nake and Trim (CI/PP) establishment accepts cloth from a retailer or cloth 
wl?olesaler/importer to be made up into garments. The owner supplies only the 
trjmmjags, so he requires little starting capital. - as little as is needed to rent 
some machines and a room. The Wage Board reported in 1935 that so many CITl 
factories had sprang up that competition allowed the wholesaler to hawk rolls of 
material from one factory Lo another. "Eventually prices are so low as to make 
it impossible for =thing but sweated wages to be paid.s' (wage Board Report, 
12.4.1935: WO. 99 
of 1936 - h 
(12) Sweated conditions in some sections of the industry wou3.a provide "llnfairff 
competition to factories with better wagas and conditions ard consequently 
threaten both profits and wage levels. 
(13) Interim Report of the Wage Board, 20.11.1926 (Armerne 58-1927). 
(14) CWXA Minutes, Special Emergency Meeting, 7 .10.1926. 
(15) Quoted in Gaxment Worker, ~an~asy/Febwruar~ 1946. 
(16) Interim Report of the Wa,ge B o d ,  20.11.1926, op. cit. 
(17) Ibid. See Appendix 11, Column 3 of table. 
(18) CWMA Minutes, 29 .11.1926. 
(19) CWMA Minutes, Joint Meeting with Cape -Western Merchant Tailors Association 
(CWA) , 2.2.1927. 
(20) Industrial Council for The Garment Manufacturing Industries, Minutes, 30.3.1927 
(cape Chmber of Industries Archives). 
(21) G o W  to Glass, 31.5.1927 (GWUSA Archives) ; CWMTA Minutes, 30.5.1927 (CCI 
Archives). 
(22) See Appendix 11, Columns 4 and 5. 
I (23) Cape Federation of Laboux Unions (CFLU) , Minutes 11.11 .l927 (9TJCS.A Archives) ; 
CWCMA Minutes, Joint Meeting with CWMTA, 12.12.1927; CWCMA Minutes, 10.11.1927. 
(24) CWCMA Minutes, Special Meeting, 19.3.1928. 
, 
l 
(25) CWCl!!IA Minutes, 27.6.1929. 
1 
l (26) Customs Tariff Commission 1935. Ninutes of Evidence, p. 3484, CWCHA 
l representativesf evidence. 
(27) Ibid., p. 3168. 
(28) Did., p. 646, TCMA representatives l evidence. 
l 
(29) Juveniles comprised 5099 of the women workers in 1926/7 and 66$3 in 1929 (social 
and Industrial Review, Special Edition, September 1929; Wage Board Report for 
the Three Years ended February 1928 - Annermre 112-1929, 2nd session) 
(30) CWCMA Minutes, 27.6.1929. 
(31) Wage Board Report, 12.4.1935 (Annexure 999-1936), pars. 41, 51. 
(32) Evidence of R. Beattie in R. v. I)e Ereitas and Others: Cape Supreme Court 
c?i?imid Appeals 2 (79), 1936. 
(33) See, for example, CFLU Annual Reports, Wage Board Reports and statements of 
Stuart and Evans to the CWCMA in Minutes,,of 13.1.1930 and 4.9.1930. 
(34) In 1929, 1930 (twice), 1931, 1932 and 1934. 
1 
(35) See Appendix 11, Column 9. Until 1932 the wages of (African) pressers in the 
Transvaal were much below those in the Cape. In a 1931 report the Wage Board 
commented: "The higher wages paid to Europeans on the Rand ... are only made 
possible by the absence of provision for pass-bearing natives in the ement . l' 
l (Annexure 82-1931/2). Wage Determination 42 applied to the whole country and 
raised African wages to the same level as at the coast. 
(36) Wage Board Report, 25.9.1927, para. 12 (Annexure 134-1927/8). 
(37) Cape Times, 28.2.1930. 
(38) Stuart did not hold any official position in the GWfJ-CP, but he maintained a 
close interest in its affairs as secretary of the Cape Federation. 
l (39) CWCMA Minutes, Special Meeting, 13.1.1930. 
(40) Evans was It. agreeable to a reduction of wages, provided that they were 
satisfied such reduction would be in the best interests of the employeest1. 
I (CWNA Minutes, Special Meeting, 4.9.1930.) 
(41) CWCMA Minutes, 30.9.1930. 
.I (42) CWCMA Minutes, Special Meeting, 1.9.1931. 
I (43) Weinbren to Sachs, 9.2.1931, Sachs to Secretary TLC, 28.9.1931; Gomas to Sachs, 
l 24.6.1931 (GWITSA Archives). 
I (44) Appendix 111. 
(45) Appendix 11, Column 6. Cape employers w e e  eager that the wage of qualified 
females should also be reduced. The CWCMA ".,. pmduced a budget showing that 
a female employee in receipt of B1.15.0d a week would be able to maintain 
herself and have a little in hand at the end of the yearit. (wage Board Report, 
23.10.31, Annexure 82-1931/2. ) The Wage Board maintained the qualified wage 
at £2. 
(46) Document entitled "R. Stuart versus E. S. Sachs - Statement in regard to 
national trade union unity", c.1945, para. 19. 
(47) Freestone to Minister of Labour, 8.3.35, printed in Trades & Labour Joumml of 
South Africa, April 1935. 
(48) GW-CP Ninutes, Annual General Meeting, 16.1.1935 (Annexure AA to the affidavit 
of E. A. Evans in Smith v. Crawfod and others: Cape Swreme Court Motions 19 
C9491 1935) 
UG 12-1914; Report of the Economic Commission, cited in Davies (1976: 11). 
CWCU Minutes, Meeting of Readymade Shirt Section, 8.4.1935. 
Statement of Rose Kemp (de De Ereitas), 1945; SA Garment Worker 1 (l), m y  1936 
(GWUSA Archives). Allegations of such intimidation were made in Parliament by 
Duncan Burnside, MP (~ouse of Assembly Debates, 18.3.1936, col. 1510) ,'but strongly 
denied by both the CWCMA and Gm-CP. 
Bnnexure BB in Smith v. Crawford and others, op. cit. 
Smith v. Crawford a.nd others, op. cit. 
Ibid. 
GWU-CP and o-hhers v. Smith, 19359 .Cm), 251. 
CWCMA Minutes, Special Meeting, 4.10.1935. 
Ibid. 
7 
TLC Circular "Re : Ga.rment Workers 1 Dispute - Cape Townw, 13.2.1936 (TOCSA .L. 
Archives). 
CWCMA Minutes, 13.8.1935. 
CWCMA Minutes, 7.11.1935. 
Ibid. 
-
Forward, 29.11.1935; 17.1.1936. 
C W C ~  Minutes, Emergency meeting, 17.2.1936. 
R. v. De -itas and others, op. cit. 
Pamphlet: "SATE - CDC Garment Workers on Strike1' (GWITSA Archives). 
Forward, 28.2'1936. 
Weinberg to Sachs, 15.3.1937, and 15.5.1937 (GWSA wives). 
Attempts were made to topple the leadership from the inside in 1944 by a 
"Gament Workers' Vigilante Comittee'?, and again in 1975-6 when an "Action 
Committee1' was formed. The latter attempt is the subject of an interssting 
article by JohaYsn Maree, "Problems with Traae Union Democracy: Case St- of 
the Garment Workers l Union of the Western Province", SA Labour Bulletin 3 (2), 
September 1976. 
Document entitled "R. Stuart v. E. S. Saohs ...", para. 27. 
I am indebted to the Library of the University of the Witwatersrand for access to the 
archives of TUCSA and the Garment Workers1 Union of South Africa, and to the Cape 
Chamber of Industries for access to the records of the Cape Wholesale Clothing and 
Shirt Manufacturers! Association. 
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APPENDIX I 
a) The Industrial Consiliation Act (NO, 11 of 9924) gave formal legal s t a tm  to 
employerst organization a d  trade unions (Itpass bearing nativesn not be* p e d t t e d  
to  be members of unions registered under the Act) and allowed for  the f o m t i o n  of 
Indwtr ia l  Councils. Industrial Councils were made up of an equal nmber of employer 
I aYld employee representatives and negotiated a code of minimum wages and. conditions. 
Subject to  the approval of the lXinister of Labour, th is  code was gazetted as tzyl 
Industrial Agreement which was legally binding on a l l  employers i n  the axea for  which I 
the Council was registered. The registration of a union as body representative of 
the employees i n  an area was the prerogative of the l'4f.nister. W s  the Minister I 
a crucial control over the fortunes of trade unior,s as, witkt0u.t mgistration, a union 1 
could not participate in an Industrial Council. Ehfomement of the Agreement was the l 
responsibility of the Counci1,which emplored a number of "agelits" to "copec-t factories 
and investigate the cornpla2nts of workem o r  employers. The Council was financed by 
I weekly levies on both workers and employers. The Act la id  down a f o d d a b l e  series 
of f o m l i t i e s  which had to be complied with before a str ike or loclc-out could take 
I place lega.3.1y. I 
b) (NO. 27 of 1925) created the W a g e  Board, a body which, on the 
instmctions of the m i s t e r  of Labour, investigated wagex and conditions i n  an 
industqy i n  a specified area. The Board subdtted s Reporb to the PLinister along with 
Recommendations on a schedule of minimwn wages and coniiitions. The Recomentaa.tion was 
published i n  order to  give interested parties an opportmi-kiy to raise objec.S;ions. The 
Board then again submtl;ted a Report and Recommendation to the MTni~tes, w"no could then 
decide whether or not to  gmette the Recommendation as a W a g e  Detemnation. The 
Minister had no powers to amend the Xecommendation himself - a~.l;oratiom to i t s  terns 
could be made only by the Board. W a g e  Detednations were legally khding on a l l  
employers i n  the industry i n  the axeas specified auld were enforced by Divisional 
Inspectors of Labour and the Depax-hent of Labour. It was intended .that the Wage Act 
should control conditions of employnent i n  industries i n  which, usually because of the 
lack of registered trade unions and/or employers f orgzmieations, industrial councils 
had not been formed. The Board, i n  se-tting wages, had to  take into accomt the abi l i ty  
of the industry to  pay. In the event of th is  consitleration pmvent- the Board from 
sett ing a mfnjmwn wage which would allow workers to support .themselves i n  accordance 
with "civilized standards of l i f e t t ,  the Ivlinister had to  be speciaEl5r informed. He 
could then direct the Board to  recommend such a lower wage as it consiihared reasonable 
for the industry. Although the Act was introduced primarily to  tzpllft %hki@ standards 
of unskilled, poor white workers, it made no distinction 'between the racea. 
Zn thei r  sl ightly amended form, the W a g e  and Industrial CsnciPiatlon Acts, 
with the Factories Act, s t i l l  fom the basis of the industrial legislatidn applicable 
to wMte , Ncolouredl' and Asiatic workers. 
U P E N D I X  3% Comparative Table of Wages of Female Machinists 
Notes: * Rendered invalid by Barone v Rex TPD April 1927. 
** Clause discouraging piecework declared invahid in 
Rex v Cohen AD 1933. 
Sources: Wage Determination No.2 (Government Gazette 3.12.1926) 
Wage Determination No.42 ( 6.G. 22.4.1932 
Wage Deteminatfon No.15 ( G.G. 8.6.1928 
Wa e Board Reports on the Clothing Industry (Annextires 
!8-1929, 398-192718) 
Wage Baard Recommendation ( G.G. 12.7.1935) 
Xndusrrial Agreement, Clothing Industry, Cape (GC 3.4.36) 
BGament b?olrlcerO November 3936 
APPENDIX I11 bployment i n  the Cape Cbthing Industry 
1926 to  1937/8 with t rends  indicated t o  1943 
T h i s  graph i l l u s t r a t e s  the cl~angcs i n  the r ac i a l  composition l 
of t h e  labour force. The increasing proportion of white female 
I labour was stimulated by the higher wage scales (introduced by 
1 the Wage Board and supported by protective tar i f fs)  2nd by .the I 9 
! 
support of some manufacturers f o r  the civiLised labour p o l i c y  . 
In 1936, 47% of women workers i n  the Cape cl.othing industry 
were whites (as compared w i t h  98% in the Tranovoal). 
* Cust~ms Tariff Comnlission 1935, Suhj.ssion of A Jj'rascr & CO, 
lourccs: blage Eoard Rcpor!:s:- Annexures 55-1927; 112-1929(2); 
" 82-1931/2; 99-1836;. 1 ' L S X - f l r  
Board o f  Trade and Inclustrier; Report  N0.303 
